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Abstract 
 
The Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition is an important building block of a 
number of theories of economic growth. We discuss these theories in a general equilibrium 
framework with two types of research and development (R&D). First, new product lines can 
be introduced by incurring a sunk cost. Second, incumbent firms can raise productivity by in-
house investment in tacit knowledge. Special cases of the model include a dynamic version of 
the Dixit-Stiglitz model, the semi-endogenous growth model, the semi-endogenous growth 
model based on variety expansion, the endogenous growth model based on in-house R&D, 
and a combination of the latter two. It is shown that the intensity of competition play quite a 
different role in the various cases distinguished.   4
1. Introduction 
 
The Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition has been the essential building 
block for the new generation of growth models that was developed by Romer (1990) and 
others. It is a well-known property of neoclassical theory that exogenous forces ultimately 
drive growth. By relying on perfect competition neoclassical growth theory could not model 
productivity  growth  and  technical  change  as  endogenous  variables.  R&D  efforts  lead  to 
increases in productivity, but typically R&D expenditures are a fixed cost, which can be 
recouped only if firms make profits. 
  Monopolistic  competition  can  generate  profits  in  the  short  run  if  the  number  of 
competing firms is not too large. In the Dixit-Stiglitz model entry of new firms will lead to 
zero profits in the long run. However, the standard assumption that new firms appear out of 
the blue does not seem realistic. Each new firm in the model of monopolistic competition 
introduces a new product variant, which may require innovative effort in the first place. The 
development of a new product requires an up front R&D expenditure. Entry then takes place 
as long as the R&D costs do not exceed the net present value of future profits that can be 
reaped by bringing the new product on the market. 
  In the Dixit-Stiglitz model the number of firms is finite in the long run. Entry of new 
firms reduces profits of all firms in the industry. This result is not changed if account is taken 
of up-front expenditure to develop new products. After the dust of entry is settled we are back 
in  a  static  economy.  What  really  changes  this  picture  is  Romer's  idea  of  intertemporal 
knowledge  spillovers.  As  the  number  of  products  increases  the  cost  of  developing  new 
products  falls,  because  innovating  firms  can  build  on  the  knowledge  developed  by  their 
predecessors. Therefore, the number of products already developed can be associated with the 
stock of ideas on which researchers can build. It is a public good that creates an intertemporal 
knowledge spillovers. As a result the cost of R&D decreases and a never ending process of 
entry and introduction of new products drives economic growth. 
  Various other models build on Romer's approach and can be classified as "variety 
expanding models" (cf. Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Chapter 3). In alternative approaches 
it  is  not  entry  but  quality  improvement  and  creative  destruction  that  induces  growth  (cf. 
Aghion  and  Howitt  1992,  1998;  Grossman  and  Helpman,  1991,  Chapter  4).  Knowledge 
spillovers are also the driving force but competition is often modelled as limit pricing rather 
than monopolistic pricing. As there appears to be no clear connection with the Dixit-Stiglitz 
model we will not discuss these other growth models in the present survey. 
  Instead we would like to focus on a third approach in endogenous growth theory that 
also starts from the Dixit-Stiglitz approach, but does not rely on the somewhat unrealistic 
feature of never ending entry. Thompson and Waldo (1994), Smulders and Van de Klundert   5
(1995), Peretto (1996) and Peretto and Smulders (2002) have developed a growth model in 
which monopolistic competing firms undertake in-house R&D that results in productivity 
improvements  for  each  firm.  As  all  existing  firms  expand  their  production  growth  is 
economy-wide. Economic growth is sustained since private research creates a tacit knowledge 
stock that reduces future R&D costs. In these models the knowledge stock is not a pure public 
good, as in the endogenous growth theories referred to above, but can be appropriated fully or 
at  least  to  a  large  extent  by  the  firms  themselves.  The  models  with  in-house  R&D  are 
representative for the system of "trustified capitalism", which Schumpeter in his later work 
had in mind as one of regimes of growth and competition (e.g. Soete and Ter Weel, 1999). In 
the regime of trustified capitalism large firms with unthreatened market positions dominate 
the  economy  and  undertake  their  own  R&D  to  reduce  cost  and  improve  productivity  or 
product quality. 
  In  the  models  with  in-house  R&D  entry  may  be  possible  in  the  early  stages  of 
development in which the number of firms is small and profits are excessive. Newcomers 
have to invest in R&D in order to develop new product lines. Under certain conditions it may 
be profitable to engage in this type of R&D, but after a while entry stops as excessive profits 
vanish. In this view entry is not essential to explain economic growth. Once entry has stopped 
incumbents dominate the market and growth is driven by the in-house creation of knowledge. 
The window of opportunity for new entrants is closed and economic growth in determined by 
large firms with their own history and future. 
  This  paper  aims  at  discussing  the  role  monopolistic  competition  plays  in  several 
theories of economic growth. We develop a general equilibrium model with in-house R&D as 
well as R&D that results in the creation of new product lines. It will be shown that different 
growth  models  in  the  growth  literature  are  special  cases  of  our  more  general  model. 
Throughout the analysis we are concerned with the determinants of equilibrium growth and 
product  variety.  Welfare  properties  of  the  equilibria  are  beyond  the  scope  of  the  present 
paper. 
  The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our model of economic 
growth allowing for two types of R&D. On the demand side account is taken of differentiated 
goods  and  a  taste  for  variety.  In  accordance  with  the  Dixit-Stiglitz  model  there  is 
monopolistic competition on the markets for goods. Perfect competition prevails in the labour 
market  and  in  the  capital  market.  Variety  expansion  models  are  discussed  in  Section  3. 
Special cases consider relate to the dynamic version of the Dixit-Stiglitz models with a finite 
number  of  firms,  the  semi-endogenous  growth  model  of  Jones  (1995)  and  the  model  of 
endogenous growth of Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, Chapter 3). The 
model with in-house R&D is analysed in Section 4. To focus on the engine of growth the 
number of firms is fixed. The latter assumption is relaxed in Section 5, where two types of   6
innovation – variety expansion and productivity improvement – are introduced. It is shown 
that  depending  on  the  number  of  firms  in  the  initial  state  there  may  be  two  phases  of 
economic growth. In the first phase both types of R&D generate the same rate of return and 
variety expansion goes along with productivity improvement. In the second phase entry stops 
and growth is driven by productivity improvements within existing firms. Conclusions are 






The composite consumption good is defined over a continuum of varieties, a mass N of which 
is available in the market:  
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Following the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) approach, the elasticities of substitution between different 
varieties is constant and equal to e > 1. We generalize this approach along the lines of Heijdra 
and van der Ploeg (1996) and Benassy (1996) by disentangling the assumption of product 
differentiation (measured by e) from the taste for variety (measured by n; n = 0 implies no 
taste for variety, n = 1/(e–1) brings us back to the canonical Dixit-Stiglitz model).   
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We assume a constant discount rate J. The curvature of the utility function is governed by the 
constant  rate  of  relative  risk  aversion  r.  The  main  advantage  is  that  the  elasticity  of 
intertemporal substitution equals a constant 1/r, which accompanies the constant elasticity of 
intratemporal substitution (e) familiar from the static Dixit-Stiglitz model. As we will see 
below,  the  relative  size  of  both  elasticities  determines  the  nature  of  the  dynamics  in  the 
model. 
Utility  maximization  gives  rise  to  a  two-stage  maximization  problem.  First, 
consumers trade off current consumption against future consumption, taking as given the   7
relative price of consumption over time, viz. the real interest rate  ˆC r p - . This gives rise to 
the Ramsey rule: 
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where hats denote growth rates, and  
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denotes  the  consumer  price  index.  Second,  consumers  allocate  per  period  consumption 
expenditures over the different varieties, which gives rise to the familiar iso-elastic demand 
function for good i:   
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In the sequel we assume symmetry so that Xi and pi are the same for each variety i. Hence we 
may write  ( ) i C N NX
n =  for the consumption index and  C i p N p
-n =  for the price index. 
Differentiating with respect to time and substituting the results into the Ramsey equation, we 
find: 
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We interpret the expression on the right-hand side as the required rate of return in the capital 
market.  The  first  term  is  the  utility  discount  rate.  The  last  term  in  parenthesis  is  the 
consumption price index inflation rate. When consumer prices increase, households require 
higher nominal interest rates. The second term reflects consumption smoothing: household 
require premium for postponement of consumption; the smaller the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution (1/r), the larger the required premium for a given rate of change in consumption 




Firms produce with labour only. Firm i needs 1/Ai units of labour to produce one unit of its 
variety:    8
 
i i xi X AL =                   (8) 
 
Variable Ai can be interpreted as the stock of firm-specific knowledge that determines the 
productivity of the firm. Note that the units of measurement of X are such that X directly 
enters the utility function, which means that A also reflects the firm’s capability to produce a 
certain level of product quality per unit of labour input. Hence, any increase in A reflects 
productivity or quality improvements, which terms we will use interchangeably.  
Each firm can expand this stock and thus improve its own productivity over time by 
allocating research labour to research and development (R&D) activities. The productivity of 
research labour LAi depends on the stock of knowledge already accumulated (Ai) and on other 
sources of knowledge, which we will later identify as spillovers from other firms, denoted by 
SA:  
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We  do  not  restrict  the  sign  of  a.  If  a  is  positive,  firms  use  the  knowledge  they  have 
accumulated in the past as an input in new research and development projects and benefit 
from  experience  and  learning  by  doing.  If  a  is  negative,  further  improving  productivity 
becomes harder the more productive the firm already is.  
Profits equal revenue minus labour costs: 
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Firms maximize the net present value of profits, taking into account the downward sloping 
demand for their product. The first order conditions for maximization imply the following 
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The elasticity of substitution (price elasticity ￿) determines the markup over unit labour costs 
w/Ai.
2 The no-arbitrage equation equates costs savings per euro invested in R&D, that is the   9
rate of return to R&D, rA, to the cost of capital, that is the required (nominal) rate of return r. 
The first term on LHS represents marginal labour cost savings in production from investing in 
knowledge divided by the marginal cost of knowledge accumulation. We see that the larger 
firm size LX, or the larger marginal research productivity 
1
A i S A
a- , the higher returns. The 
second term on the LHS captures the increases in research costs over time due to factors the 
firms cannot control (wage cost and spillovers). The larger these cost increases, the more 
attractive it is to undertake R&D now rather than later, that is, the higher the current return to 
R&D. The equation only applies in an interior solution with R&D (LAi > 0). In a corner 
solution without research,  A r r <  and  0 Ai L = .   
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Market structure: entry 
To model entry as a dynamic process, we assume that potential entrants have to incur a sunk 
cost to develop a blueprints for a new product line. The introduction of new product lines, or 
variety expansion for short, can be considered as the second type of R&D in the model, 
alongside in-house R&D directed to quality improvement within existing product lines as 
described above. The research technology is such that if LN units of labour are allocated to 
variety expansion, a flow of SNLN new firms is created.  
 
N N N S L = ￿                   (14) 
 
Free entry in R&D ensures that the price of a blueprint, pN, equals the cost of developing a 
blueprint, w/SN. The price of a blueprint in turn equals the value of a blueprint for an entrant, 
vN. This value must be such that investing money in blueprints gives a return that equals the 
return in the bonds market, which implies  ˆ / N N v v r p + = . Substituting p, from (10) and 
(11), and  / N N N v p w S = =  we find the following no-arbitrage equation: 
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The LHS represents the return to investing in new product lines, the return to entry (rN) for 
short. The first term represents the profit flow from a new product line relative to the cost to 
develop the new line. The second term represents the increase in development cost over time. 
This equation only holds in an interior equilibrium (LN > 0). If no entry takes place, we must 
have rN < r and LN = 0. 
 
Labour market equilibrium 
Labour supply is exogenous at level L and grows at rate gL. Total labour demand equals 
demand for production, and for the two types of research. With symmetric firms, this implies 
the following labour market clearing condition: 
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3. Growth through variety expansion 
 
We first study growth driven by the expansion of product variety. We show how the seminal 
growth models developed by Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991, chapter 3), and 
Jones  (1995)  can  be  seen  as  a  dynamic  version  of  the  Dixit-Stiglitz  model  extended  for 
knowledge spillovers that govern the cost of entry.   
To focus on entry, we assume that all research effort in the economy is devoted to 
developing  new  product  lines  (LAi  =  0).
3  Moreover  we  assume  that  the  cost  of  entry 
endogenously changes over time. The idea is that research on new product lines builds on a 
stock of public knowledge. Individual research efforts contribute to public knowledge, that is, 
there are knowledge spillovers from private research to the public knowledge stock.  Since 
research aims at expanding N, we can relate the knowledge stock to N. In particular, research 
productivity SN increases with N:  
 
N S N
f = c         1 f£           (17) 
 
From labour market clearing condition, we can derive 
1 ˆ ( / ) ( ) Xi N L N N L
-f f = c -c , which 
we can rewrite as an expression for how 
1 / L N
-f  evolves over time: 
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where gL is the exogenous growth rate of the labour supply. 
The capital market is in equilibrium if the return to innovation rN equals the rate of 
return required by households rc. Combining the Ramsey equation (7) and the no-arbitrage 
equation  (12),  solving  for  ￿
Xi L ,  and  rewriting  using  the  above  labour  market  condition, 
1 ˆ ( / ) ( ) Xi N L N N L
-f f = c -c , we find: 
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Equations (18) and (19) now form a system of two differential equations in 
1 / L N
-f  and 
Xi N L
f , the first of which is predetermined, while the second can jump. We can therefore 
easily set up a phase diagram with these two variables on the axes, cf. the three panels in 
Figure 1. Recall that the relevant parameters are research productivity c, spillover parameter 
f, intratemporal and intertemporal substitution e and 1/r, taste for variety n, discount rate J, 
and  population  growth  rate  gL.  The  exact  nature  of  the  phase  diagram  changes  with  the 
parameters, as we will discuss below. The adjustment is saddle point stable as long as the first 
term in brackets in (19) is positive. For f < 1, the saddle path slopes up (down) if the second 
term in brackets is positive (negative), that is if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
(1/r) is small. Points above the 45-degree line are infeasible since they imply a violation of 
the labour market constraint (16).  
 
*** insert figure 1 a, b, c Phase diagram of the variety expansion model *** 
 
Special case i (Dynamic Dixit-Stiglitz model):  0 L g f = =   
By assuming  0 L g f = = , we find the simplest dynamic version of the Dixit-Stiglitz model: 
rather than instantaneous entry, we have time-consuming entry (sunk cost rather than fixed 
cost).  The  dynamic  model  reduces  to  two  differential  equations  in  N  and  LXi  and  is 
represented  in  Figure  1a.  If  the  number  of  firms  happens  to  be  large  initially,  such  that 
/ ( 1)/ L N < J e- c ,  the  economy  is  stuck  in  a  stationary  equilibrium,  in  which  N  is 
historically determined and  / Xi L L N = . The market has to be shared by so many firms that 
the  rate  of  return  to  entry  falls  short  of  the  minimum  required  rate  of  return  J  and  no 
investment  takes  place.  In  contrast,  if  the  initial  number  of  firms  is  small,  such  that   12
/ ( 1)/ L N > J e- c , entry takes place and the economy approaches a steady state that can be 
characterized by:  
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This steady state can be easily related to the static Dixit-Stiglitz model. In the static 
version with flow fixed cost F per firm and instantaneous entry, we find  ( 1) Xi L F = e -  and 
/ N L F = e  (cf. Neary’s chapter in this book). Hence, in the dynamic model, the term J/c 
takes over the role of the fixed cost in the static model. Note that this term equals the steady 
state interest rate (J) times the set-up cost (1/c), and therefore represents the annualized setup 
cost. The preference parameters n and r do not affect the steady state solution. The taste-for-
variety parameter n measures how the cost of capital changes with a change in product variety 
(see (7)), the intertemporal substitution parameter r measures how the cost of capital changes 
with a change in consumption. In the steady state, both consumption and variety are constant 
so that the two parameters do not play a role.  
The dynamics of the model enrich the picture of monopolistic competition. In the 
static  Dixit-Stiglitz  model  firm  size  is  fixed  (which  is  criticized  in  Neary’s  Chapter). 
However, in the dynamic model outside the steady state, firm size LXi decreases or increases 
over time along the saddle path for two reasons. First, the number of firms cannot change 
instantaneously. Second, if total savings in the economy changes, total sales, which is shared 
among  incumbents,  changes.  A  large  part  of  the  labour  force  may  be  allocated  to  R&D 
activities in the short run, thus reducing the amount of labour for the firms that are already in 
the  market.  In particular,  firm  size  increases  (decreases)  with  the  number  of  firms  if  the 
saddlepath in Figure 1 slopes downward which requires: (1+n)/n < 1/r; it slopes downward if 
the latter inequality is reversed. In the canonical DS formulation (where n = 1/(e-1)) this 
reduces to e < (>) 1/r. So what matters is whether the intratemporal elasticity of substitution 
(the  DS  variable  e)  is  larger  or  smaller  than  the  intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution. 
Intuitively, if the taste for variety is large (e small) and the intertemporal elasticity is large, 
and  if  the  economy  starts  with  a  small  number  of  firms,  it  is  attractive  to  postpone 
consumption and massively invest in more variety, which makes firms small in the short run 
when variety is still small, but large in the steady state when variety has expanded.  
Per capita income equals  / ( )/ Xi C L N NL L
n = . In the steady state this boils down to 
/ ( /( 1) ) C L N L
n n = = c e - J . Hence we see that if labour supply grows, per capita income 
grows because of the love-of-variety effect. This previews an important mechanism in the 
semi-endogenous growth models discussed below.    13
 
Special case ii (Semi-endogenous growth): 0 1, 0 L g < f < >   
By allowing for some, but limited, knowledge spillovers and population growth, we find a 
case in which the steady state is characterized by growth. The reason is that entry goes on 
forever and thus allows for gains from increasing specialization. This case is a simplified
4 
version of Jones’ (1995) model of “semi-endogenous growth” and of Eicher and Turnovsky’s 
(1999) “non-scale growth model”. 
Figure 1b depicts the corresponding phase diagram. The dynamics differ from those 
in  the  previous  case  mainly  because  of  population  growth,  which  prevents  a  stationary 
equilibrium to arise. In an economy that starts with a small size relative to the number of 
firms such that 
1 / ( 1)/ L N
-f < J e- c , innovation is not profitable enough, as above. All 
labour is allocated to production ( / Xi L L N = ) and population growth makes total production 
grow (and equilibrium moves along the 45-degree line). Per capita production stays constant 
in  this  first  stage  of  economic  growth  (which  captures  some  aspects  of  the  Malthusian 
regime). At some moment in time, population growth has resulted in large enough markets to 
warrant innovation. In this second stage of growth the economy moves along the saddle-path. 
The growth rate of per capita consumption now gradually increases over time, as is reflected 
by the vertical distance between the 45-degree line and the saddle-path.  
A steady state is characterized by constant 
1 / L N
-f  and  Xi N L
f , which requires a 
constant rate of variety expansion  ˆ /(1 ) L N g = -f  and a constant share of production in total 
employment  / Xi NL L.
5  Hence  ˆ ˆ
Xi L N L g + =   and  the  long-run  growth  rate  of  per  capita 
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The key difference with the previous case is that per capita growth may be unbounded. This 
requires n > 0, so that growth is driven by the taste for variety. New firms enter every period, 
so that consumers can divide their expenditures over an increasing range of product variety, 
which increases real consumption to the extent that they love variety. Unbounded growth also 
requires population growth (gL > 0). Ongoing entry is threatened by diminishing returns: more 
firms means smaller firms and thus lower returns to entry so that entry stops. A growing 
labour force offsets this. 
Slightly reinterpreting the model along the lines of Ethier (1986), we may state that 
an ongoing process of increasing specialization in production drives growth, so as to capture   14
Adam  Smith’s  view  on  growth.  One  arrives  at  this  view  by  interpreting  the  sub-utility 
function for C as a production function for final goods C, in which Xi are intermediate inputs 
and N is the number of intermediate inputs. Parameter n then measures how much producers 
benefit from using a larger number of specialized inputs, that is, how much they benefit from 
increased specialization.  
 
Special case iii (“Endogenous growth”):  1, 0 L g f = =   
For the case of critically large spillovers, viz.  1 f = , and zero population growth, the model 
reduces to an “endogenous growth” model in the spirit of Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 
3) and Romer 1990.  
The phase diagram for this case  – depicted in Figure 1c – is one-dimensional since 
the  variable  on  the  horizontal  axis
1 / L N L
-f =   is  a  constant.  As  a  result  Xi Xi N L NL
f =  
immediately jumps to the value for which ￿ ￿ 0 Xi Xi N L NL
f = = , see (19). Hence, there is no 
transitional dynamics. From (1), (8), (14), and (16) the growth rate of consumption can be 
calculated as  ˆ ( ) C Xi g N L NL = n = nc - , which implies  ( / ) Xi C NL L g = - nc . Substituting 
this expression and ￿ ￿ 0 Xi Xi N L NL
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              (22) 
 
Different  from  the  previous  case  is  that  growth  may  be  unbounded  without  population 
growth. More firms means lower profits per firm, but due to strong spillovers ( 1 f = ), also the 
cost of entry declines strongly, so that it remains attractive to enter, no matter how large N 
already is.  
The  key  difference  with  the  previous  case  is  that  the  long-run  growth  rate  of 
consumption depends on intertemporal preference parameters. A higher discount rate (J) or a 
lower  rate  of  intertemporal  substitution  (1/r)  implies  a  lower  growth  rate.  If  we  would 
introduce production taxes or research subsidies, these would affect the long-run growth rate, 
too. The taste-for-variety (or returns-to-specialization) parameter affects growth positively as 
above.
6 Lower values of e imply both higher profits and faster growth
7 and in this sense 
competition is bad for growth.  
 
 
4. Growth through in-house R&D   15
 
A less desirable aspect of growth models based on variety expansion is that entry of new 
firms  (or  the  emergence  of  new  industries)  and  increased  specialization  within  firms 
(industries) cannot be disentangled. Although some periods of growth may be characterized 
by rapid changes in market structure and extended periods of entry of new firms, in most 
periods growth stems from research within a limited number of established firms. Gort and 
Klepper (1982) show that over the life cycle of an industry, only in the initial phase entry of 
new firms is the dominant source of growth. Malerba and Orsenigo (1995) take a sectoral 
perspective and compare the dominant source of innovation in different sectors. They find 
that only eleven out of the thirty-three industries patents are predominantly granted to new 
innovators. This suggests the existence of two different regimes of the innovation process that 
drives  growth,  one  based  on  entry  and  another  based  on  in-house  R&D.  Schumpeter 
elaborated  on  both  regimes,  labeled  “competitive  capitalism”  and  “trustified  capitalism” 
respectively. In the latter, innovation is conducted by large and established firms that engage 
in monopolistic competition and try to capture some of the market shares of their rivals. 
Established firms have an advantage over entrants because they can build on experience and 
tacit firm-specific knowledge. Innovation strengthens their position in the market, since it 
expands the stock of firm-specific knowledge. 
We now model some elements of trustified capitalism by studying growth driven by 
quality improvement within product lines. We consider the case that is opposite to the one 
analysed in the previous section: we abstract from entry, and assume that all innovation takes 
the form of quality improvement within existing firms (LN = 0, N is treated as a parameter). 
This results in a model similar to Thompson and Waldo (1994) and Smulders and van de 
Klundert (1995).
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As in the previous section, we also allow for knowledge spillovers to capture the idea 
that research builds on public knowledge. The public knowledge stock rises with research 
effort. Since research aims at increasing A, we can now relate the knowledge stock to average 
A  in  the  economy,  which  equals  Ai  because  of  our  symmetry  assumption.  In  particular, 
research productivity SA increases with A:  
 
A S A
y = x                   (23) 
 
Parameter  y  captures  intertemporal  between-firm  knowledge  spillovers.  We  already 
introduced intertemporal within-firm knowledge spillovers as captured by a. We denote total 
intertemporal  spillovers  by  y + a º j.  From  this  specification  of  spillovers,  the  R&D   16
function (9), the symmetry assumption ( i A A = ), and the labour market clearing condition 
(16), we find: 
 
1 1 ˆ ( / ) ( / ) Xi A L NA L A
-j -j = x -x             (24) 
 
Using this equation, we find the following expression for how 
1 / L NA
-j evolves over time: 
 
￿ 1 1 1
/ ( / ) (1 ) ( / ) (1 ) ( / ) L N Xi L NA g L NA L A
-j -j -j = - -j c + -j c     (25) 
 
where gL/N is the growth rate of the per firm labour supply, which we take as a parameter. 
The capital market is in equilibrium if the return to innovation rA equals the rate of 
return  required  by  households  rc.  Combining  the  Ramsey  equation  and  the  no-arbitrage 
equation, solving for  ￿
xi L , and rewriting using the above labour market condition, we find: 
 
￿ ( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 1 1
( / ) ( / ) (2 ) ( / ) (2 ) 1 Xi Xi L A L A L NA
-j -j -j ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
= x j-a + -j - x -j - a+ -j - J ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ r r r ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 
                      (26) 
 
We now have a system of two differential equations in 
1 / L NA
-j and 
1 / Xi L A
-j, so that we 
can again set up a phase diagram to analyse the dynamics. The adjustment is saddle point 
stable as long as the first term in brackets of (26) is positive. The saddle path slopes up 
(down)  if  the  second  term  in  brackets  is  positive  (negative),  that  is  if  the  elasticity  of 
intertemporal substitution (1/r) is small. Figure 2a and 2b depict the phase diagrams for two 
parameter combinations.  
 
*** insert Figure 2 Growth with in-house R&D *** 
 
  The phase diagrams for the variety-expansion model and the quality-improvement 
model are very similar, so that we need not go through all cases. Due to the similar structure, 
similar conclusions hold with respect to the feasibility of growth in the long run. It can be 
easily checked that long-run growth is unbounded, either if some exogenous growing factor 
compensates  for  the  diminishing  returns  ( / 0 L N g > ,  see  Figure  2a),  or  if  spillovers  are   17
sufficiently large to result in constant returns with respect to the reproducible factor ( 1 j =  
and constant returns with respect to A arise, see figure 2b). 
  In the latter case of endogenous growth ( / 1, 0 L N g j = = ), the dynamic system 
boils down to a simple single differential equation: 
 




r = x r+ -a × -x r-a -J          (27) 
 











= + r-a ￿ ￿ r+ -a x ￿ ￿
            (28) 
 
The associated rate of consumption growth equals the rate of productivity growth since with 
symmetry 
v










                (29) 
 
The  key  property  of  this  expression  is  that  growth  depends  on  intertemporal 
preference  parameters.  If  we  introduced  production  taxes  and  research  subsidies,  growth 
would be affected by these policy variables. In short, the long-run growth rate is endogenous. 
Similar to the endogenous growth case of the variety expanding model, growth increases with 
research productivity (x) and decreases with J and r. 
Intertemporal knowledge spillovers show up as a determinant of long-run growth. In 
particular, the degree to which intertemporal spillovers can be appropriated by firms (a) is 
positively related to growth. The higher a, the more the firm’s own research efforts contribute 
to the reduction in future R&D costs (see (9)), and thus the higher the incentive to invest in 
R&D.  In  the  variety  expansion  model,  no  individual  researcher  could  internalize  the 
contribution of its own research efforts to future research cost reductions, because only the 
public knowledge stock affects research costs and the own contribution to the public stock is 
perceived as negligible.  
Growth depends positively on the firm size measured by labour available per firm 
L/N. Like in the model of endogenous growth driven by variety expansion, see (22), a larger   18
firm size implies a larger market in which the results of R&D can be commercialized, so it 
boosts the return to innovation.  
The  key  parameter  from  the  Dixit-Stiglitz  model  (e)  does  not  show  up  in  the 
expression for the growth rate. There are three reasons for this: symmetry among firms, no 
creative destruction, and the assumption of fixed number of firms.  
Aghion et al. (2001) set up a growth model with a large fixed number (say N) of 
industries, in each of which two firms produce goods that enter consumer preferences with a 
constant elasticity (say e) as in the Dixit-Stiglitz approach. Firms set prices as in a Cournot 
duopoly and choose R&D effort. Since the returns to R&D are stochastic in this model, 
duopolists may end up with different productivity levels even if they start at the same level. If 
they start at the same level, R&D is more profitable with a higher degree of substitution e, 
since a given quality advantage over the rival firm produce a bigger boost in profits, the more 
easily consumers substitute for the rival’s output. 
Product market competition as measured by e does not directly affect innovation of a 
fixed number of symmetric firms. However, as we have seen in the variety expansion model, 
once we allow for entry, the number of firms is negatively related to the product market 
competition parameter e: lower profit margins require larger firms in equilibrium. Since in the 
quality improvement model growth is stimulated by larger firm size (L/N) we may expect 
more competition (higher e) to result in faster growth once we relax the assumption of a fixed 
number of firms. This is what we turn to in the next section.  
 
 
5. Growth with variety expansion and in-house R&D 
 
We  now  combine  the  two  models  to  explore  the  interaction  between  entry  and  in-house 
innovation. To simplify we assume the following: 
 
  0, 1, 1 L g = f = j = r =  
 
These  assumptions  imply  that,  first,  there  is  neither  population  growth  nor  intertemporal 
spillovers  in  entry,  second,  there  are  strong  intertemporal  spillovers  in  productivity 
improvements,  and,  third,  utility  is  logarithmic.  The  last  assumption  only  simplifies  the 
expressions for the transitional dynamics. The first two assumptions guarantee that long-run 
growth is driven by productivity improvements within product lines and that the number of 
firms is finite. Note that with these assumptions, a = 1 - y and SN = c is a constant. Also note   19
that now the phase diagrams for the variety expansion and quality improvement model can 
both be depicted in the L/N, LXi plane (cf. Figure 1a and 2b). 
  We first examine which type of innovation is undertaken in equilibrium. Any type of 
innovation can only be undertaken if its rate of return is at least the market rate r. Substituting 
the labour market clearing condition (16) into the no-arbitrage equations (12) and (15), and 
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  (31) 
 
Figure  3  depicts  the  two  relationships  as  reaction  curves  –  of  entrants  and  incumbents 
respectively – in the LN/N, LAi plane, where r and N can be treated as parameters for firms take 
them as given. Points above an agent’s reaction curve implies that her rate of return falls short 
of the interest rate r as indicated by the minus sign. Both reaction curves slope negative. The 
point of  intersection  represents  an  equilibrium  in  which both  types  of  innovation  yield  a 
return equal to the market interest rate r and in which the labour market clears.  
 
*** insert Figure 3 reaction curves *** 
 
The  figure  shows  that  this  equilibrium  is  stable  if  the  entrants’  reaction  curve  is 
steeper than the incumbent’s reaction curve, which requires y > e - 1. If the equality is 
reversed, the equilibrium is unstable: slightly increasing (decreasing) the amount of labour in 
entry increases the return to entry (in-house R&D). Hence, if y < e - 1 in-house R&D and 
entry never occur simultaneously and equilibrium is driven by either variety expansion or in-
house R&D. Since we analysed these situations in the previous sections, we can here restrict 
attention to the case in which both types of innovation are undertaken simultaneously because 
they  yield  the  same  return  in  a  stable  equilibrium.  From  (30)-(31)  we  can  derive  that  a 
necessary conditions for this equilibrium to exist is  
 
y > e - 1 > c/x                 (32) 
 
Equating the rates of return in (30) and (31), we find the rate of productivity improvement for 
an equilibrium with both in-house R&D and variety expansion: 
   20
 
( 1) / ˆ
( 1)( / )
Ai Xi A L L
￿ ￿ e- -c x
= x = x ￿ ￿ e- y-c x ￿ ￿
            (33) 
 
Substituting the second equality and the labour market equilibrium condition (16) into (14), 
we find the rate of variety expansion: 
 
 
( 1) / ( 1)( / ) ˆ





￿ ￿ e- -c x+ e- y-c x
= c -c￿ ￿ e- y-c x ￿ ￿
        (34) 
 
Substituting this result into (30) and equating the resulting expression for the rate of return on 








ec ￿ ￿ = -c -J ￿ ￿ e- ￿ ￿
              (35) 
 
We use (34)-(35) to set up the phase diagram in the LXi, L/N plane, as shown in Figure 4. 
Under the assumptions made in (32), the  ￿/ 0 L N =  locus has a positive slope that is smaller 
than 45 degree. Points above the locus imply either LN < 0 when  N A r r = , which must be ruled 
out, or  N A r r <  when  0 N L = , which implies a situation with constant N. The  ￿/ 0 L N =  
locus from (34) cuts the  ˆ 0 Xi L =  locus derived from (35), which also slopes upward. If the 
economy starts with a small number of firms, entry takes place and the economy moves along 
the saddlepath. Production per firm falls over time. In the long run, the number of firms 
approaches the following value: 
 
( 1)
( 1)( / ) ( 1) /
L
N N
￿ ￿ c y- e-
= º ￿ ￿ J e- y-c x + e- -c x ￿ ￿
        (36) 
 
If the economy starts with a large number of firms,  N N > , the rate of return to entry falls 
short  of  that  of  in-house  R&D  for  any  positive  amount  of  labour  allocated  to  variety 
expansion,  as  can  be  easily  checked  from  (30)-(31).  Hence,  only  in-house  R&D  can  be 
undertaken in equilibrium. We can use the  ˆ 0 Xi L =  locus from the model with in-house R&D 
only, see (28), after setting r = 1. This line cuts the 45-degree line at  / / L N = J x. Points 
above the 45-degree line must be ruled out since they imply  / Xi L L N > , which violates the   21
labour market clearing condition. Hence, for  / L N N x J< < , growth is given by (29), and 
for  / N L < x J, the growth rate is zero.   
 
*** Insert Figure 4. Phase diagram *** 
 
The most natural scenario is that the economy starts with a low number of firms 
(N N < ). Then two stages of growth emerge. In the first stage, entry and in-house R&D 
occur simultaneously. Once a critical number of firms has entered the market, a second stage 
of growth starts with in-house R&D only. Note that this growth pattern resembles the product 
life cycle that is empirically relevant on industry level: in a mature economy, the number of 
firms is stable, and each of them devotes resources to productivity improvement. The long-
run growth rate in this situation can be calculated as: 
 
[( 1)( / ) 1] ˆ
( 1)
C g A
e- x c - J
= =
y- e-
              (37) 
    
Competition, as measured by a high value for e, boosts long-run growth in this model, 
as is clear from (37). The reason is already explained above: larger price elasticities imply 
smaller profit margins for monopolistic firms, so that starting new firms is less attractive. 
Firms are larger in the mature economy, which makes in-house R&D more profitable and 
enhances growth. Hence, while growth did not depend on e in the quality improvement model 
and did depend negatively on e in the variety expansion model, growth depends positively on 
e once we combine the two models. 
Another important contrast to the results in the previous sections, is that the scale of 
the  economy,  as  measured  by  the  labour  force,  does  not  affect  the  growth  rate,  but 
intertemporal preferences do. Hence we have endogenous growth without the so-called scale 
effect. The scale effect implies that larger economies grow at a faster rate, basically because 
they can exploit knowledge in a large market. The empirics on postwar growth do not support 
this model prediction. In the previous sections, the scale effect showed up whenever growth 
was endogenous (by which we mean that it depends on intertemporal preference parameters 
and policy variables), see (22) and (29). In the semi-endogenous growth variants above, the 
scale effect was removed by assuming diminishing returns with respect to knowledge, but that 
assumption rendered growth independent of intertemporal preference parameters (or policy 
variables), see (21). In the model that combines quality improvement and variety expansion, 
an increase in the scale of the economy (larger labour force L) results – for a given number of 
firms  –  in  more  labour  per  firm,  larger  sales  per  firm,  and  higher  profits  and  therefore   22
incentives to both higher levels of in-house R&D and development of new product lines. If 
indeed more firms enter, the process of variety expansion gradually reduces the market for 
individual incumbents, thus offsetting the higher incentives to in-house R&D. In the long-run 
equilibrium with a larger labour force, the number of firms is proportionately larger, but each 
firm invests at the same rate as in the economy with a smaller labour force.
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The rate of growth does not depend on the taste-for-variety parameter n. The number 
of product varieties in the steady state is constant over time so that the taste for variety does 
not affect the cost of capital (see our discussion of (20)). If we allow for population growth as 
well  as  non-unitary  elasticity  of  intertemporal  substitution  (1/r),  the  number  of  firms 
continuously grows as in the semi-endogenous growth model (in particular  ˆ
L N g =  so that 
L/N is constant) and n enters the expression for the long-run growth rate:  
 
[( 1) / 1]( ) [ ( 1)] ˆ ˆ




g g A vN
e- x c- J+r + y- e- n
- = + =
y- e- - r- e- x c-
    (38) 
  
Finally it should be noted that the growth rate depends positively on the discount rate 
J, which seems counterintuitive. High discount rates discourage investment, but there are two 
types of investment now. Investment in variety is reduced (the number of firms  N  declines 





The Dixit-Stiglitz approach has been the main way of incorporating monopolistic competition 
in models of economic growth based on research and development. Monopolistic competition 
is an essential feature of these models since monopoly profits provide both the incentives to 
undertake R&D and the means to finance R&D.  
The degree of monopolistic competition, as measured by (some measure inversely 
related  to)  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  product  varieties  (e)  affects  growth  in 
different directions in the various types of growth models. If variety expansion (entry) drives 
growth (and in models of creative destruction), more competition (higher e) is bad for growth 
as it reduces the profits that can be reaped by the innovators that enter the market with new 
product lines. If in-house R&D drives growth, which is the case in the “trustified capitalism” 
regime, an increase in competition is good for growth. A higher elasticity of substitution 
implies lower profits margins and a smaller number of firms that can survive in the market.   23
On average firm size will be larger, which boosts innovation since the return to innovation 
can be captured in a larger share of the market.  
The  role  of  product  variety  also  differs  in  the  various  models.  In  the  variety 
expanding growth models, an ongoing process of entry of new firms drives long-run growth. 
The  model  captures  Adam  Smith’s  idea  that  increasing  specialization  drives  productivity 
gains. However, in these models there is no distinction between the number of firms and the 
number of specialized consumption goods or intermediary inputs. While the number of goods 
(or inputs) may indeed capture specialization, the number of firms is an aspect of industrial 
organization, and ideally the two should be kept separately. In the model with both entry and 
in-house R&D, entry stops once a critical number of firms is in the market. In-house R&D 
becomes the engine of growth. This model reflects the industry life-cycle pattern in which 
entry is followed by consolidation.  
  This survey has shown that the Dixit-Stiglitz approach has been fruitfully used as an 
essential building block in growth theory and that a rich set conclusions can be derived about 
the dynamic implications of monopolistic competition and product variety. It is also clear that 
further studying the interaction between different types of R&D in monopolistic markets is a 
promising avenue to study stages of growth and dynamics of market structure. Finally it 
should be noted that we only dealt with models that explore the elementary driving forces 
behind growth. Twenty-five years after the publication of the Dixit-Stiglitz model and eleven 
years  after  the  publication  of  the  first  Dixit-Stiglitz-based  growth  models,  we  are  still 
witnessing  a  rapid  growth  in  the  literature  on  how  growth  is  related  to  capital  market 
imperfections, income inequality, labour markets, social norms, environmental problems and 
many other issues. It is the Dixit-Stiglitz model that makes it possible to study these important 
topics.    24
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Notes 
                                                      
1 We will show that ￿ 0 i NX =  in the steady state. Note that then a change in variety has two opposing 
effects: a consumption smoothing effect (growing variety means growing consumption, so households 
require higher rate of return) and a price effect (growing variety means declining effective prices so a 
lower nominal interest rate is accepted). The first dominates if r > 1. 
 
2 In the tradition of the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, firms ignore the impact of 
their own actions on total consumption and the price index of consumption, because there is a 
continuum of firms and the actions of each firm on the total are negligible. In contrast, if the number of 
firms is not that large and firms act strategically, oligopolistic competition prevails and the mark-up 
depends not only on the elasticity of substitution (e) but also the number of (symmetric) firms (cf. 
Yang and Heijdra 1993). Under oligopolistic competition the outcomes depend on the reaction 
hypothesis introduced with respect to firm behaviour. Different regimes of competition lead to different 
mark-ups for a given number of firms and substitution parameter. The regime of competition affects 
growth as is shown in Van de Klundert and Smulders (1997). In the present paper we ignore strategic 
interactions and oligopoly.  
  
3 This situation can arise endogenously in the full model, for example if SA is sufficiently small. Below, 
we will return to the determination of which type of research is undertaken in equilibrium. 
 
4 In Jones (1995), variety matters for production rather than for preferences, moreover physical capital 
is required to produce varieties, rather than just labour as in our model.  
 
5 Note that 
1 / ( )/( / ) Xi Xi NL L N L L N
f -f = , in which both terms in parentheses are constant.  
 
6 Now even the growth rate of the number of firms (see the term in parentheses) is affected. 
ˆ / (1 ) C sign N sign g ¶ ¶n = -r .  
 
7 Differentiating we find  / [(1 ) ( )] C sign g sign L L ¶ ¶e = -r nc - J+c . Positive growth requires 
L c +J> eJ. Bounded utility requires  ( 1) 0 C g J+ r- > , which after substitution of gC implies 
(1 ) L eJ> -r c . Hence, if growth is positive and utility is bounded,  (1 ) L L J+c > -r nc  and 
/ 0 C g ¶ ¶e < . 
 
8  Thompson  and  Waldo  (1994)  model  research  as  a  stochastic  process  and  ignore  within-firm 
intertemporal spillovers (this case arises in our model if a = 0 and y = 1). The key element of trustified 
capitalism  is  that  “creative  accumulation”  rather  than  “creative  destruction”  drives  growth.  In  this 
respect, the trustified capitalism model contrasts to the “Schumpeterian” models of Grossman and 
Helpman (1991 chapter 4) and Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998), which all rely on creative destruction. 
What our model of trustified capitalism has in common with these models is that growth is possible 
without an increase in variety. In these “Schumpeterian” models with creative destruction, new firms 
replace old firms. There are two reasons not to deal with this class of models in this chapter. First, these 
models are often structurally isomorph with the variety expansion models (see Grossman and Helpman 
1991,  p.  98)  and  yield  similar  insights.  Second,  these  models  rely  on  perfect  substitutability  and 
(Bertrand) limit pricing rather than the Dixit-Stiglitz approach of modeling competition. 
 
9 Young (1998), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), and Howitt (1999) have used this mechanism to 
remove scale effects; Peretto and Smulders (2002) provide the microeconomic foundation for the key 
assumption that the cost of in-house R&D depends on A only and not on N. 